Kevin Kerr v. Warden Allenwood USP by unknown
2021 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
11-8-2021 
Kevin Kerr v. Warden Allenwood USP 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021 
Recommended Citation 
"Kevin Kerr v. Warden Allenwood USP" (2021). 2021 Decisions. 917. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021/917 
This November is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in 2021 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
DLD-242        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






KEVIN KERR, a/k/a Allah, 




WARDEN ALLENWOOD USP 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-21-cv-00199) 
District Judge:  Sylvia H. Rambo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
August 5, 2021 
Before:  JORDAN, KRAUSE and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges 
 








* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




 Pro se appellant Kevin Kerr appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his 
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  We will dismiss this appeal as frivolous. 
 Kerr, who was sentenced to life in prison and then committed to a hospital for 
mental-health treatment, see 18 U.S.C. § 4245, filed a § 2241 petition raising a variety of 
claims.  He argued that the commitment order should be set aside; that officials violated 
his rights under the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act by placing a substantial 
burden on his “divine right to represent himself,” ECF No. 1 at 7; and that his conviction 
should be invalidated because he was incompetent and his due-process rights were 
violated. 
The District Court dismissed the petition, holding that Kerr’s challenges to his 
underlying conviction must be asserted in a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and 
that his challenges to the conditions of his confinement must be asserted in an action 
under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971).  ECF 17 at 7, 9.  Finally, the Court noted that while a challenge to Kerr’s 
commitment under 18 U.S.C. § 4245 was cognizable in a habeas petition, he was 
“lawfully confined for mental health care and treatment.”  Id. at 9.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1  Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), we will dismiss the appeal as frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis 
either in law or in fact.”  Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 
 
1 Federal prisoners do not require a certificate of appealability to appeal the dismissal of a 
§ 2241 petition.  See Reese v. Warden Phila. FDC, 904 F.3d 244, 246 (3d Cir. 2018).   
3 
 
We conclude that the appeal lacks an arguable basis in law and fact.  In the brief 
Kerr has filed in this Court, he has failed altogether to identify any flaws in the District 
Court’s order.  Instead, the brief is replete with baseless arguments such as that the 
commitment order “places a substantial burden on this Appellant’s Free Religious 
Exercise of His Copyrighted and Registered Holy Qur’an Literal Article-Free National 
Name ‘ALLAH.’”  Br. at 5.   
Moreover, on our independent review, Kerr has no arguable basis to challenge the 
District Court’s judgment.  To the extent that Kerr presented civil-rights claims, these 
claims do not challenge the fact, duration, or execution of his sentence, and therefore 
cannot be pursued via habeas.  See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494 (1973); 
McGee v. Martinez, 627 F.3d 933, 936 (3d Cir. 2010).  To the extent that Kerr attacked 
his underlying conviction, “[m]otions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are the presumptive 
means by which federal prisoners can challenge their convictions or sentences,” Okereke 
v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002), and he has not shown that he falls 
within the narrow exception in which a § 2241 petition is permissible, see Bruce v. 
Warden Lewisburg USP, 868 F.3d 170, 180 (3d Cir. 2017); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 
245, 251–52 (3d Cir. 1997).  Finally, even assuming that it was permissible for Kerr to 
challenge his commitment via § 2241, see generally Archuleta v. Hedrick, 365 F.3d 644, 
648 (8th Cir. 2004), he did not meaningfully show either that the order was erroneous 
when issued or that it should be lifted now.    
 Accordingly, we will dismiss the appeal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).  
